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Japan has emerged in recent years as a leading donor country to African countries. At one level, 
Japan’s renewed assertiveness in providing foreign aid to Africa is on par with the more active 
approach by other donor countries. Some might argue that Japan’s motivations to lend capital 
and technical assistance to African countries are shared by all lending countries. However, I 
argue that Japan’s official development policy and, in particular, the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, seek to break away from the acceptance 
of the Washington consensus and to demonstrate Japan’s particular leadership position in the 
donor community.  
Rather than to focus on domestic bureaucratic politics to explain Japanese ODA or on the 
specific targets of foreign aid, this paper seeks to identify the basic features of Japanese national 
identity that explain its aid policy to Africa. These features will be highlighted through an 
analysis of the TICAD process. Taken as a whole, the TICAD process represents the Japanese 
government’s response to perceived inroads by globalization and neoliberal economic ideology. 
…/. 
Keywords: foreign aid, African development, Japanese-African foreign relations 
JEL classification: F33, F55, O19  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
But TICAD is more than a simple response to complex global forces. Japan’s foreign aid policy 
draws extensively from the so-called Asian development model as Japan hopes to influence 
African societies. Moreover, by carving out a developmental niche away from the conventional 
World Bank pattern of financial assistance, Japan also hopes to highlight its global strategic 
position as it seeks to have greater influence in Africa and other developing regions. 
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Japan has emerged in recent years as a leading donor country with African countries. At 
one level, Japan’s renewed assertiveness in providing foreign aid to Africa is on par 
with the more active approach by other donor countries. It might appear to some that 
Japan’s motivations to lend capital and technical assistance to African countries are 
shared by all lending countries. However, I argue that Japan, its official development 
policy and, in particular, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD) process, seek to break away from the acceptance of the Washington 
Consensus and to demonstrate its particular leadership position in the donor community. 
As one well regarded Japanese economist claimed recently, Japan has been ‘walking the 
splendid path of isolation’ (Ishikawa 2005: 34). 
Rather than to focus on domestic bureaucratic politics to explain Japanese official 
development aid (ODA) or on the specific targets of foreign aid, this paper seeks to 
identify basic features of Japanese national identity that explain for its aid policy to 
Africa. These features will be highlighted through an analysis of the TICAD process. 
Japan now has had nearly fifteen years of organizing global conferences on African 
development. Since the early 1990s, Japan has been the only developed country to 
consistently hold major international conferences on African development. In fact, it has 
held three conferences, scheduled every five years in 1993, 1998, and 2003. A fourth 
TICAD is planned for 2008. Given that Japan only provides about 10 per cent of its 
ODA funds to Africa and given the severe economic pressures with which the country 
was burdened for much of this period, the reasons for organizing these major 
development conferences are not self-evident. In fact, most studies only mention 
TICAD in passing, as it relates to other development issues (Morikawa 1997). Despite 
the budgetary constraints and cutbacks in Japan’s ODA in the last several years, Japan 
has remained consistent in scheduling these conferences. Rather than turn its attention 
away from Africa during this economic slump, Japan has moved forward with its aid 
policies towards Africa.  
2  Themes of Japan’s national economic identity 
2.1 Historical  lessons 
One underlying theme in Japanese foreign aid is its history towards economic 
development both within Japan and towards Asia. Some observers point to the 1868 
Meiji Restoration and the experiences of post-Second World War development as 
lessons for successful economic strategies. In both cases, the push for growth was 
derived from the importation of foreign technology, high productivity, low 
consumption, and a dualistic structure of the economy (Okita 1980: 116). The initial 
principle of Japanese economic growth at that time was production-oriented policies 
that led to rapid economic growth. As Okita describes the process, the government at 
that time focused on basic industries, then the modernization of those industries, 
followed by the establishment of new industries, which led eventually to export 
promotion policies (ibid.: 127). 2 
2.2  East Asian experience 
One of the more important aspects underlining Japan’s ODA policy is its relationship to 
the ‘Asian economic model’. Former Prime Minister Koizumi said in a speech at the 
2005 G8 summit that ‘Asia’s post-war experiences in economic development are 
valuable assets for us in assisting African development’ (Koizumi 2005: 3). He went on 
to argue that ‘in view of Asian experiences, the key to African economic development is 
to foster the private sector through the promotion of trade and investment’ (ibid.). 
The East Asian economic miracle was a powerful force in linking African and Asian 
societies. According to Japanese economists, ‘a key lesson from East Asia is that if aid 
is to be effective in the long run, it would have to lead to private capital formation, both 
domestic and foreign’ (Hino and Iimi 2006: 16). Moreover, the East Asian experience 
has affected Japan’s approach to development and aid in Africa. In particular, the main 
characteristics of Japan’s ODA facilitate self-help and partnership through 
industrialization and trade. Experience has shown that Japan puts a high priority on 
economic infrastructure development with a heavy emphasis on loans. 
As one Japanese economist noted in regards to Japanese policy to Ghana, ‘based on its 
own and East Asian catch-up experiences, Japan considers it essential to address the 
structural problems of the Ghanaian economy and support its economic growth and 
attainment of self-reliant and sustainable economic development’ (Ohno 2006: 18). 
Given its success in East Asia and its own economic history, Japan has increasingly 
shown assertiveness in the donor community. The organization and commitment to the 
TICAD process has been one important and visible affirmation of Japan’s self-identity 
as a leading donor country. 
Compared with the neoclassical orthodoxy that stresses macroeconomic stability and 
free markets, the emerging Japanese view is distinct in its primary pursuit of long-term 
real targets, acceptance of different economic policies for different conditions of 
development, and emphasis on the active role of government as an initiator of change. 
2.3  Japanese model as distinct from other donors 
Japan has tried to carve out its own separate path of ODA policy. Two historic factors 
make Japan’s aid and development vision distinctive from those of other donors. Japan 
is the only non-western country with a history of successful industrialization and 
Japan’s postwar decision to abandon military forces implies that ODA plays a special 
role in Japanese diplomacy. Japanese officials moreover have at times distanced 
themselves from the dominant policy prescriptions embedded in the Washington 
consensus. The Washington consensus has been widely criticized in Japan as being 
ineffective and unfair in its application to African countries. The typical structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) may be most effective in middle-income economies, but 
it is less effective in low-income economies with underdeveloped markets. An 
influential Japanese economist has suggested that in such economies there is a need to 
build appropriate institutions. These country-specific institutions should be based on a 
‘proper understanding of cultural values and social norms (Hayami 2005: 56). 
In this departure from the Washington consensus framework, government officials in 
Japan also advanced poverty reduction, not as an immediate objective of development 3 
assistance, but as a consequence of economic growth. ‘If poverty reduction is 
considered an overarching objective, nonmarket instruments may have to be used to 
redistribute market-produced income in favour of the poor’ (Hayami 2005: 57). What 
this entails for Japanese aid agencies is a justification of a ‘new paradigm which 
emphasized strengthening the voice and power of poor people (empowerment) and 
maximizing the initiative of aid-recipient communities (ownership) in the design of 
development assistance’ (ibid.). Japan’s ODA White Paper for 2005 asserts that poverty 
reduction should be carried out through economic growth. It highlights the experience 
of East Asia where development was based on economic growth which ultimately 
contributed to poverty reduction (MoFA 2006: 13). Koizumi (2005: 1) took the lead in 
this discussion in 2005 when he declared in a speech that ‘the Japanese government has 
been leading international discussion on African development by advocating the 
importance of ownership of Africa and partnership with the international community’ 
(Koizumi 2005: 1). 
My argument builds on the research conducted by a number of Japanese scholars who 
interpret Japanese foreign aid policy as providing a useful and important alternative to 
that of the World Bank. Ohno makes a vigorous claim that Western and World Bank 
ODA positions do not reflect Japan’s economic interests or its political leadership 
abilities. ‘Every few years (the donor organizations) come out with new assistance 
strategies, which in many cases do not match the sensibilities of the Japanese. We have 
left the control to other nations, and Japan’s role is not more than that of a timid copilot 
at best’ (Ohno 2002: 1). Additionally, Ohno argues that ‘Japan  …  makes past 
experience its starting point, perceives value in diversity, and emphasizes issues of the 
real economy involving the fostering of industry’ (ibid.: 2). The divergence between 
Japan’s objective of a development assistance strategy and that of the World Bank is 
significant. Ohno concludes that ‘in the field of ODA, Japan cannot manifest its true 
character as long as it perceives only two passive options to pick between—toeing the 
line of the World Bank’s strategy or complaining about that line’ (ibid.: 4). 
Other Japanese scholars similarly note Japan’s distinctive features of its ODA 
programme. As this study will examine in more detail, Japan’s ODA policies have 
reflected its emphasis on self-help. The basic position of self-help is meant to separate 
Japan’s policies from the west. By shifting responsibility to the recipient, self-help is 
meant to allow for more autonomous decisionmaking on the part of the receiving 
country. But more importantly, as Nishigaki and Shimomura have written, ‘in contrast 
to the traditional western view that aid is an obligation that those who are fortunate owe 
to those who are not, the Japanese concept is that aid means helping those who help 
themselves’ (Nishigaki and Shimomura 1999: 152-3). 
This paper draws from the view that Japan’s ODA strategy seeks to create an alternative 
to the dominant World Bank/Washington consensus arguments. In particular, the paper 
explores the evolution of the TICAD process with close attention paid to the three 
conferences by asking the following question. In what way does the TICAD agenda 
attempt to position Japan’s ODA strategy and policy as separate and unique from the 
western ODA efforts? The conferences often have been discussed in the context of the 
Asian model of development. To what extent has this model been raised by the TICAD 
process? This article seeks to explain and understand this question by examining the 
evolution of Japan’s ODA policy towards Africa and the history of the TICAD process 
covering the three TICAD meetings. 4 
3 TICAD  I 
With a formal statement in place to facilitate policy dialogue with other donors and with 
recipient countries, Japan turned its attention to Africa. In 1992, Japan called for an 
international conference involving the donor community, African governments, and 
non-governmental organizations. While previous aid conferences typically involved the 
donor community speaking among themselves or a summit held by an OECD country 
(such as the UK or France) with participation by former colonies, Japan intentionally 
sought a broad and inclusive conference format. Japan asked the United Nations and a 
non-governmental organization (the Global Coalition for Africa) to serve as co-
sponsors. One analyst suggested that by enlisting the involvement of these agencies, the 
‘TICAD initiative was not a unilateral act, but that it was essentially consistent with the 
priorities of the entire UN system of organizations’ (Mulikita 1999: 52). Moreover, it 
was held in Tokyo in order to raise public awareness of African issues. According to the 
MoFA official in charge of the first TICAD, Japan’s motivation to organize this 
conference was three-fold. Japan clearly saw the humanitarian needs in Africa and 
given Japan’s economic wealth, it could create a positive aid environment. Second, 
Japan desired to be treated as a major global power by both other powerful countries as 
well as by the majority of countries in the world. As a latecomer in providing aid to 
Africa, Japan needed Africa as a means to inject itself as a leading donor country. Third, 
as part of its strategic plan to position itself as a major Asian power, Japan used TICAD 
as a platform to put forward the so-called Asian development model. During the 1980s, 
Japan began to criticize the negative impact of structural adjustment policies in Africa 
and, in more general terms, criticizing the so-called Washington consensus and 
neoliberal policies. Japan’s view of the Asian development model offered an alternative 
to African countries. This new view will be discussed later in this section. 
One observer wrote that, by the early 1990s, ‘a consensus began to develop in Japan on 
the measures that must be taken to prevent Africa from “falling off the map” ’ (Eyinla 
1997: 39). One important measure was a coordinated effort by donor countries led by 
Japan to focus a new aid strategy towards Africa. In October 1993, Japan convened the 
first TICAD. The conference consisted of nearly 1000 participants from 48 African 
countries, thirteen major donors, ten international organizations, and more than 45 
NGOs. The most important outcome from this conference was the approval of the 
document, ‘Tokyo Declaration on African Development’. This document broke new 
ground in terms of a global and collaborative approach to international aid to Africa. Its 
themes emphasized partnership, ownership, and the Asian model of development. 
The preamble of the Declaration states that the participants believe the document will 
‘serve to strengthen an emerging new partnership for sustainable development of Africa 
based on self-reliance of African countries and the support of Africa’s development 
partners’ (TICAD 1993). Partnership implied equivalent influence and input into the 
development process. In contrast to the traditional World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund approach which dictated policies to recipient countries, TICAD’s 
framework explicitly called for mutual interaction as equal members. The Declaration 
also states that ‘with the end of the cold war, African countries and the international 
community now have an opportunity to share a broader common understanding of the 
need for dynamic development cooperation’. Japan’s view of partnership was also broad 
and inclusive. It called for a more vigorous incorporation of non-governmental 
organizations into the development process. Governments are only one agent in the 
development process. The end of the cold war demonstrated to Japan the importance of 5 
persuading public opinion, civil society, the private sector, and NGOs to act as 
participants in this process. The Declaration calls for ‘full participation by the people at 
all levels, who should be galvanized towards action as agents for progress’. 
The concept of ownership was an implicit principle in the Declaration. It emerged as an 
identifiable concept in later ODA documents. A TICAD II paper referred to ownership 
as being ‘derived when development priorities, as set by Africa are pursued. This 
ownership should be based on continuous dialogue between government, the private 
sector and civil society’ (TICAD 1998a). But for Japan, ownership was used 
strategically to direct attention towards its request-based aid policy. Instead of going 
directly to African countries with money and specific projects, Japan waited for those 
governments to take ‘ownership’ of their development needs, decide on targeted 
projects, and then approach the Japanese aid agencies. As we will see, by the late 1990s, 
this emphasize came under heavy criticism by both recipients and by the donor 
community. 
The Asian model of development was inserted into the Tokyo Declaration on behalf of 
the Japanese government. In light of its criticism against the over reliance of structural 
adjustment policies (SAP) and its interpretation of Asian economic development during 
the 1980s, the Japanese government offered an alternative development strategy. Eyinla 
notes that ‘in order to avoid some of the greatest pitfalls associated with the failure of 
the structural adjustment programme, the declaration recognized the linkage between 
political and economic reforms’ (Eyinla 1997: 41). In contrast to the World Bank’s 
separation of political from economic reforms, the participants of TICAD specifically 
recognized the necessity of these reforms as well as the painful consequences resulting 
from their implementation. The Declaration called for greater consideration of the 
‘specific conditions and requirements of individual countries’ by SAPs. Japan used this 
criticism to launch what it called ‘the Asian experience of economic development’. In 
examining the success of Asian countries, the Declaration noted that ‘the backdrop of 
development success lies in the combination of a strong commitment by the leadership 
and the people to economic prosperity, appropriate long-term development strategies 
and functional government administration to purse these strategies coherently’. This 
assertion, with Japan’s own experience as central, has been extended and elaborated in 
latter TICAD documents.  
What were the results of the first TICAD? According to a noted scholar on Japanese 
foreign policy to Africa, there were few concrete gains for Africa since TICAD I. ‘The 
results of the conference have more symbolism than substance, because the effective, 
results-based initiatives were not forthcoming, neither from the African nor the 
international communities’ (Morikawa 1997: 205). While specific gains were lacking, 
TICAD did have broader outcomes. The development momentum initiated by TICAD 
led to the promotion of African-Asian dialogues. A TICAD II document stated that ‘a 
more concrete outcome of the TICAD I process was the emerging South-South 
partnership forums which emerged to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills 
from Asian to African countries’ (TICAD 1998b). 
Yet, more concrete and tangible outcomes did emerge from TICAD such as several 
post-TICAD initiatives centred on institutional building. These included the Partnership 
for Democratic Development, conflict prevention and resolution activities, and the 
African Aid Initiative. And Japan achieved several concrete objectives as a result of its 
leading role in the conference. Despite the intentional statement of TICAD being a non-6 
pledge conference, African countries look favourably upon Japan’s initiatives and aid 
philosophy. As one government official commented in an interview, TICAD I was 
‘good PR’.1 This good will translated into favourable votes on behalf of Japan. 
Although Japan failed to win a seat on the Security Council, one scholar observed that 
‘there is strong inference that TICADs were electioneering activities for gaining a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council—a supreme wish for the government of 
Japan leaders’ (Takahashi 2002: 8). However, Japan did prevail in other areas. In 1996, 
Japan relied on Africa’s bloc voting to win the Asian region non-permanent seat on the 
Security Council, the election of Shigeru Oda as Justice of the UN International Court 
of Justice, and the election of Sadako Ogata as head of the UN High Commission for 
Refugees. But more importantly, these initiatives underscored Japan’s willingness to 
pursue its strategic objectives by positioning itself as an alternative to the dominant 
ODA institutions. 
At the end of TICAD, the government announced it would host TICAD II in 1998. 
TICAD II would not only assess the implementation of the Tokyo Declaration, but it 
would ‘chart strategic direction for African development into the twenty-first century 
(Mulikita 1999: 53). Despite the government assurances, I interviewed several 
government officials involved in the TICAD meetings who felt that, at the time, there 
would not be a TICAD II.2 Yet the positive experience felt by the Japanese government, 
the donor participants, African governments, and NGOs propelled discussion towards a 
second TICAD. An official with the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation 
commented that TICAD itself was ‘stunning and remarkable’. 
The first TICAD conference is suggestive of Japan’s interest to claim its role and to 
increase its visibility in Africa. Japan’s criticisms of conventional structural adjustment 
policies and neoliberalism emerged at this time. These criticisms led to the promotion of 
Japan’s own ‘Asian model of development’. Moreover, Japan initiated new language 
that focused on partnership and ownership with Africa to highlight the important 
distinction from western aid agencies and governments. 
4 TICAD  II 
The period between TICAD I and II (1993 and 1998) represented a different geo-
strategic and financial environment than the one leading up to the first conference. The 
end of the cold war had created new and long-lasting pressures on official development 
assistance. Financial resources were being redistributed towards Eastern European 
countries while the world’s attention was increasingly on the situation in Iraq. 
Moreover, the financial constraints remaining from the East Asian crisis became more 
permanent in Japan. Africa was on the back burner. ODA had dropped from US$23.4 
billion in 1994 to US$15.3 billion in 1999 (TICAD 2001: 1). Japan’s ODA budget was 
cut by 10 per cent in 1997. Yet, Japan continued to press for an Asian development plan 
that could be utilized by African recipients of Japanese aid. The Tokyo Declaration on 
African Development emphasized the ‘relevance of the Asian experience for African 
                                                 
1   Interview with MOFA official (April 2003). 
2   Interview with JICA official (February 2003). 7 
development’. Moreover, ‘the backdrop of development success lies in the combination 
of a strong commitment by the leadership and the people to economic prosperity, 
appropriate long-term development strategies, and functional government 
administration to pursue these strategies coherently’ (TICAD 1993: 4). 
Post-cold war trends both in the international community and in Japan forced the 
Japanese ODA administration to re-evaluate ODA both generally and in terms of 
Africa. The ministry of foreign affairs sponsored a reassessment which was published in 
early 1998. The report made clear that the East Asian financial crisis had placed serious 
financial constraints on the government’s ability to finance aid. The report noted that 
while Japan’s economy accounted for a significant portion of global GNP, it plays a 
marginal role in international defence and security affairs. ‘Today, Japan should be 
striving to meet its obligations to the world by pursuing and implementing ODA 
reforms that reflect recent domestic and global trends, and that enable it to better satisfy 
the genuine needs of international society’ (MoFA 1998: 4). In particular, the report 
accurately described Japan’s earlier ODA strategy to emphasize self-reliance, debt 
repayment, and the promotion of economic production. The government following 
TICAD I began to re-evaluate this strategy. Japan examined certain political conditions, 
including human rights, efforts by the recipient to democratize or adopt a free market 
system and trends in the development of weapons for mass destruction. 
The ODA Reforms report stated that ‘Japan needs to explore the long-range prospects 
for economic independence while also furnishing emergency humanitarian assistance, 
and should prioritize aid for the satisfaction of basic human needs, human resources 
development, and other areas that can be expected to facilitate the eradication of 
poverty’ (ibid.: 7). In other words, Japan began to move away from a strict 
implementation of economic development policies to a strategy that combined both 
economic development and poverty eradication. In a list of ten ODA objectives, the 
report places poverty elimination and social development as the first one. Yet the 
second objective is infrastructure development. As the report states, ‘economic 
advances are essential to the goal of human-centred development; in this respect, ODA-
backed infrastructure projects can be expected to retain their value for some time to 
come (ibid.: 9). 
In its conclusion, the report urged the Japanese government to assume a leadership role 
in ‘forming global partnerships by assisting efforts in south-south cooperation, 
coordinating aid with other industrial powers, and collaborating with multilateral 
institutions’ (ibid.: 27). As part of its leadership position in ODA, Japan introduced a 
third way for economic development in the developing world. According to one 
observer, Japan used the East Asian miracle as justification for its FODA policy in the 
1990s. Japan made the implicit argument that the neoliberal economic strategy was not 
the only way to achieve economic development. In fact, the business community in 
Japan criticized the government for providing resources to too many high income 
developing countries that in turn competed directly against Japanese firms on aid 
projects (Katada 2002: 335). Instead, in 1996 the Economic Cooperation Committee of 
the ministry of international trade and industry recommended that Japan’s ODA strategy 
should be used primarily to lower risks of infrastructure investment undertaken by 
private investors. The TICAD process and series of conferences related to African aid 
and development mirror this recommendation. Indeed, TICAD II’s primary theme was 
‘poverty reduction through accelerated economic growth and sustainable development, 8 
and effective integration of African economies into the global economy’ (TICAD 
1998a: 1). 
TICAD II was held in October 1998 with over 400 delegates including representatives 
from 120 countries and international organizations. The theme of the conference was 
‘Poverty Alleviation and Integration of Africa into the Global Economy’. The primary 
objective was to emphasize the poverty reduction strategy through increased economic 
growth, not just debt relief or grants. The second objective was to shift the burden of 
planning and decisionmaking to African countries. Ownership of the development 
process was again highlighted at this conference. A third objective was to establish an 
African-Asian partnership as central to economic development process. In particular, 
Japan’s view on this objective was to apply what it considers successful development 
experiences in Asia to the development activities in Africa (TICAD 1998b: 7). As the 
report states, the underlying principles of TICAD II were ownership and partnership. It 
makes the point that ‘ownership is derived when development priorities, as set by 
Africa, are pursued. This ownership should be based on continuous dialogue between 
government, the private sector, and civil society (TICAD 1998a: 2). 
The primary document laid out at the conference stated that ‘TICAD I involved 
outlining the problem areas in African development and tried to focus on the general 
means for addressing these issues. TICAD II aims to focus more specifically on the 
areas to be developed, using the framework outlined in TICAD I as a basis for 
cooperation’ (TICAD 1998b: 9). The document suggests an action plan, but with no 
concrete financial commitments, the recommendations were fairly empty. However, as 
a form of logic and direction for the development process, the ‘Tokyo Agenda for 
Action’ achieved some goals. 
TICAD II illustrates the wide gulf between the development strategies and policies of 
the World Bank and those of the Japanese government. The government argued during 
TICAD II that reduction of poverty should be viewed as a result of economic 
production. It should not be solely a target of development through debt relief and the 
extension of new grants. A second difference is the emphasis placed on governance as a 
condition for new financial assistance. Japan expressed doubts on the ability and 
appropriateness of governments and international organizations to measure good 
governance. Finally, they differed over the meaning of globalization and whether it is 
effective in reducing poverty. 
One analyst wrote that ‘the Archilles heel of the agenda lay in determining where the 
enormous resources to implement its laudable objectives would come from’ (Mulikita 
1999: 53). In other words, the conference ‘neither yielded any dramatic increases in 
official development assistance to African countries, nor did it result in practical 
measures to deal with the crushing debt burden which most Sub-Saharan African 
countries have to bear’ (ibid.: 51). But following the kinds of achievements resulting 
from the first TICAD, TICAD II actually led to a deepening of understanding of the 
development problems in Africa and building on Asia-Africa cooperation. Moreover, 
the Japanese government focused explicitly on promoting Asia-Africa cooperation. The 
conference document stated that ‘one of the main goals of TICAD I was to promote 
Africa-Asia cooperation, and this has improved substantially in the last five years so 
that Asia is now a major investor in Africa’ (TICAD 1998b: 14). In particular, 
TICAD II developed a partnership with Africa based on its rice production. The New 
Rice for Africa (NERICA) has been discussed as a major and practical achievement of 9 
the TICAD process. NERICA emerged as a powerful agent linking the government’s 
objectives of Asia-Africa cooperation, the growing role of NGOs, and positive 
publicity. TICAD II set the stage for the development of NERICA as this important 
agent. According to one Japanese development economist, NERICA was a ‘brand new 
idea’ that sprung from the synergy of Japanese leadership and financial support and 
Japanese rice production experience. The chair of TICAD III stated that ‘NERICA is an 
excellent example of how a variety of partners—African governments, farmers, 
international agencies, and donors—can work together on actions with potential for 
quick development impact’.3 This cooperative endeavour that led to NERICA also has 
established links with the New Economic Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) and TICAD III. A NEPAD official said that ‘NEPAD is therefore keen to 
explore further how NERICA can be integrated into the existing varietal portfolio of 
African farmers with complementary technologies, sound natural resource management 
practices, and improved rice marketing and distribution systems (Mkandawire 2003). 
TICAD II also created confidence in Japanese foreign policy to either initiate new 
foreign policy endeavours or to partner with other foreign governments. For Japan, 
TICAD solidified for Japan its pre-eminent role in world affairs. While TICAD I had 
links to NGOs, TICAD II extended cooperation with them and the creation of new aid 
initiatives. In particular, the ministry of foreign affairs sought to bring together the 
global commitments from TICAD II and the focused objectives of NEPAD (MoFA nd). 
NEPAD was formally endorsed by the Organization of African Unity in July 2001 and 
now has links to many aspects of Japanese policy towards Africa (Kanbur 2002). The 
principles of African ownership fit into Japan’s overall framework of providing 
assistance to Africa. A Japanese ambassador commented that ‘Japan has advocated 
consistently since the first TICAD in 1993 that the most essential principle for African 
development is: First, Africa would exert its ownership, and then, the international 
community would extend cooperation through partnership (Enoki 2002: 3). The TICAD 
guideline is meant to bridge Japan to international initiatives, such as the G8 Summit 
talks, the Strategic Partnership with Africa, and South-South Cooperative Initiative. In 
particular, Japan used TICAD II as a means to present its plan for debt relief. Japan has 
been the largest among G7 creditors in providing bilateral loans to the 40 heavily 
indebted poor countries. It thus became the leading contributor in terms of bilateral debt 
relief under the initiative. However, the Japanese government had previously resisted 
calls for debt relief. As a top donor, it feared it would have to cover a disproportionate 
share of the cost. More crucially, aid administrators were reluctant to write off loans to 
poor countries for ‘fear of encouraging moral hazard or discouraging fiscal discipline’ 
(Castellano 1999). Yet, the government successfully presented its plan to the 1999 G7 
summit although differences remained based on the best ways to promote development 
in the developing world and on the difference between grants and loans. Japan remains 
committed to economic production to pull Africa out of its poverty and focuses on loans 
as a means to ensure correct economic policies. TICAD II illustrates the tension 
exhibited by Japan’s emphasis on its self-help approach on the basis of request-based 
aid and the pressures from other OECD states to be more proactive and multilateral in 
providing aid.  
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Immediately following TICAD II, MoFA issued a statement declaring ‘solidarity 
between Japan and Africa’ with attention to ‘concrete actions’ (MoFA nd). The 
development objectives focused on enhancing the linkage between the NEPAD and 
TICAD processes. In particular, the government of Japan committed itself to spend 
US$750 million over a five year period between 1998 to 2003 to invest in basic human 
needs areas. The government also pledged US$2 billion to implement a new initiative 
on education in Africa. A third step was the promotion of Asia-Africa cooperation. 
MoFA used this plank to share Asia’s development experiences with Africa especially 
in the areas of rice production (NERICA) and Asia’s development experiences. 
At the time of TICAD II, the Asian financial crisis created barriers for increased growth 
in aid, yet Japan still pushed at least in its documents for a strengthened partnership with 
Africa based on Asian economic policies and values. Additionally, Japan continued to 
break from the Washington consensus emphasis on debt relief. Instead, Japan sought to 
reorient discussion towards its own approach of expanding economic production.  
5 TICAD  III 
Although many Japanese participants in TICAD assumed it would disappear, the 
process continued albeit slowly and with uncertainty. In 1998, the possibility of a 
TICAD III was not even mentioned by officials in MoFA. Indeed, one observer wrote in 
1999 that ‘the aim of TICAD III would essentially be to reinforce Tokyo’s credentials 
as a responsible major power constructively contributing to global order and 
governance. If on the other hand, it is judged that the vote to enlarge the UN Security 
Council will not take place in the foreseeable future, then Tokyo might well discreetly 
jettison the TICAD initiative by pleading domestic economic constraints and 
conveniently transfer operational responsibility to a multilateral diplomacy (Mulikita 
1999: 54). 
Despite the continued slump in the Japanese economy, the government pursued the 
policies derived from TICAD. A common theme among those interviewed concerned 
Japan’s interest to obtain a seat on the Security Council. The Japanese government 
viewed TICAD I and II as means to showcase its leadership as a major international 
donor. Japan sought entry into the ODA process in order to demonstrate its leadership 
on the world stage, to highlight what it considered the success of the Asian development 
model, and to secure a seat on the UN Security Council. Japan’s approach during the 
period of the first two TICADs remained bilateral though it had the appearance of 
multilateralism with the invitation to co-sponsor the initiative to the Global Coalition for 
Africa, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Yet, following TICAD II, pressures 
mounted on Japan to alter its foreign aid approach in general and to Africa in particular. 
The government was careful not to set up a bureaucratic conference secretariat. In part, 
it did so to minimize administrative costs, but it also sought to keep administrative 
control in the hands of Japanese bureaucrats, especially in MoFA. Given the absence of 
any new money contributed to TICAD’s initiatives, simply offering to host a third 
TICAD was a government’s goal. 
Two factors motivated the Japanese government to consider organizing TICAD III. In 
the few years following TICAD II, the aid initiatives received a boost from the creation 
of the African Union and the formation of the NEPAD. They both reinvigorated the 11 
ODA process by formalizing Africa’s willingness to assume ownership, partnership, 
and governance over ODA. An African diplomat wrote that ‘the underlying principles 
of ownership and partnership in TICAD and NEPAD are essential for helping Africa 
deal with the various challenges militating against its sustainable economic growth 
(African Diplomatic Corps 2002). This view was formalized at the TICAD Ministerial-
level Meeting in December 2001. The chair’s statement ‘also welcomed  …  NEPAD 
launched by African leaders as a concrete commitment to assume effective leadership 
and accountability in realizing the principles of ownership and global partnership’. 
NEPAD is an amalgam of debt relief measures proposed by South Africa, Senegal, and 
Nigeria. Ownership and partnership are key concepts emanating from what President 
Mbeki of South Africa refers to as a ‘new paradigm shift of Africa’. In contrast to 
previous SAPs which were externally imposed on African governments by international 
organizations, NEPAD’s approach places emphasis on self-responsibility and, equally 
important, on active participation based on a perceived stake in the process and outcome 
of development. A Japanese diplomat at TICAD writes that ‘the basic attitude of Japan 
to fully respect the ownership of the recipient government in conducting development 
aid is derived from her own historical experiences in the modernization process. The 
modernization process of Japan since the Meiji Era was a history to harmonize through 
exercising full ownership the introduction of modernization and the preservation of 
traditional culture’ (Enoki 2002: 4). With the end of the cold war, ownership is to be 
understood within a democratic context. Pressure increased in the late 1990s by both 
donor governments and recipient countries to democratize Africa and to reform its 
administrative structure. 
A second factor derived from the change in the request-based lending approach. 
Academics and some policy officials have criticized the long standing policy of waiting 
for African governments to initiate request for specific amounts of aid. What some have 
suggested is that Japan should publicly utilize its development experiences by sharing 
them with African countries. As one high official in the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation said in an interview, ‘the ODA community should use our role and our 
own experiences’. The evolution of thinking is related to a cultural argument expressed 
by many officials. A more direct approach to lending money has been tied to a 
Japanese-based view of development knowledge and experiences. Some have expressed 
the importance of cultural identity in the TICAD process. A few former MoFA officials 
commented on the Asian identity as a departure from western views on development 
and foreign aid. Indeed, another MoFA official mentioned that ‘the ‘Asian experience’ 
means bring alternative approaches to development and the ODA process’. 
Although one MoFA official stated in an interview that as late as 2002, few government 
officials believe TICAD III would be scheduled, the conference was in fact organized. 
And these factors were imbedded in the third conference. In the first planning document 
for TICAD III, MoFA officials listed TICAD’s aims as: 
i)  to awake international attention towards Africa; 
ii)  to promote African ownership; and  
iii)  to strengthen international partnership. These objectives were then tied to the 
so-called pillars of TICAD III.  
They were the synergy between TICAD and NEPAD; Japan’s leading role in the ODA 
process; expanded involvement of civil society and the private sector; and renewed 12 
international partnership (MoFA 2002). Interestingly, when asked in an interview about 
the selection of these four pillars with two high ranking MoFA officials involved in the 
TICAD preparation, both replied there was no particular reason for their selection. The 
public objectives of TICAD were for consumption by domestic and foreign interests. 
According to these MoFA officials, TICAD III had a ‘hidden agenda’. In the absence of 
financial support for its commitments, Japan has to rely on the good intentions of the 
TICAD process and on the positive view from African countries of Japan’s leadership 
role. As they said, ‘TICAD has name value, but there is no money in our pocket’. 
TICAD III was held at the end of September 2003. As the largest of the three 
conferences, more than 1000 participants attended representing 89 countries, including 
23 heads of state from Africa, 50 African countries, and 47 international organizations.  
Foreign Minister Kawaguchi formally presented TICAD III’s objectives to the African 
Union in August 2002. These objectives had changed from the ones the MoFA staff 
expressed in interviews. Japan, in its view, would give priority to: 
i)  Asia-Africa cooperation;  
ii)  human-centred development; and  
iii)  efforts to consolidate peace (Kawaguchi 2002).  
The first is a common theme in Japanese statements and interviews with officials. The 
main claim is that Africa can learn from the development experiences of Japan in recent 
decades. As Ms Kawaguchi remarked in her speech, ‘we believe that Asia’s experience 
and expertise in development may also be useful for African development in the   
twenty-first century, because Asia, in the latter part of the twentieth century, approached 
development challenges that are similar to Africa’s situation’. 
In regard to human-centred development, the foreign minister stressed the solid 
initiatives introduced by Japan following TICAD II. In particular, she pointed out 
funded projects in the areas of education, health, and the supply of safe water. Her 
statements were supported by the final TICAD III agenda. Human-centred development 
emphasized human resources, water, and health and medical care. A related theme was 
entitled ‘poverty reduction through economic growth’. Of these pillars, this one in many 
ways is the most significant and it also illustrates Japan’s departure from more 
conventional development stances. As the statement declares, ‘without economic 
growth, poverty reduction cannot be realized’. The lessons of Japan’s economic success 
have been attributed to research and development, the development of special strains of 
rice, the development of basic infrastructure, increased trade and investment with Asia, 
debt relief, and the promotion of economic growth. 
She was the briefest in discussing the third objective of efforts towards the 
consolidation of peace. Japan has had limited experience in this area and has introduced 
few measures. Since TICAD II in 1998, Japan has supported a number of initiatives 
aimed towards conflict resolution. These schemes have included the Landmine Trust 
Fund, the Grant Aid for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, and the UN Small 
Arms Fund.  
As the government moved closer to TICAD III, it drew on previous international 
conferences and aid commitments. A TICAD III ‘concept paper’ drew attention to these 13 
recent initiatives. The Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 followed by the 
International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico and 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg discussed African 
development. Additionally, the G8 in 2002 adopted the ‘Africa Action Plan’. The 
concept paper stated that ‘TICAD III will maintain and further strengthen this 
momentum and contribute to reaffirming the partnership in the international community 
assisting NEPAD’. 
These themes were reinforced in the TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration published 
in October 2003. ‘Thus, the TICAD process has contributed to enhancing ownership 
and partnership to develop genuine solidarity that leads to expanded and multi-layered 
cooperation in support of African development’. The Declaration points to the four 
pillars of TICAD. First, it breaks from the Washington consensus policy prescriptions of 
strict privatization and neoliberal policy objectives. ‘This challenge can best be met by 
adopting a mutually reinforcing combination of two approaches: state-led development 
based on leadership and democratic governance, on the one hand, and community-based 
development based on the empowerment of individuals, on the other’. This viewpoint 
stems from the Japanese government’s emphasis of its own historical path of economic 
development and which has constituted an alternative to neoliberalism. 
Second, conflict and security issues dominate the development process. The declaration 
emphasizes the role of international partnership in ‘extending comprehensive and 
integrated assistance to African countries’. Clearly, this newly inserted objective 
derived from 9/11 and the perceived link between poverty and terrorism. 
Third, human security is a broad set of objectives that highlight problems such as 
poverty, hunger, infectious diseases, and a lack of education. These objectives have 
been highlighted by the international community at least since the Millennium Summit 
in 2000. 
Finally, the declaration emphasizes African ownership of the development process. The 
TICAD process should encourage and strengthen Africa’s confidence by recognizing 
the force of African-owned development. Ownership has been an integral component of 
all three TICAD meetings. 
The final TICAD III agenda had something for nearly every participant. It first laid out 
the accomplishments of the previous TICAD meetings, including the financial 
commitments made by the participants with special focus on Japan’s contribution. The 
document then articulated the ‘TICAD’s Approach’ towards assisting African countries 
in their development process. The TICAD approach fundamentally implies cooperation 
between African countries and Asian countries based on the twin principles of 
ownership and partnership. By establishing and deepening the policy dialogue with 
African countries through NEPAD, the long-term objective is to institutionalize the 
TICAD process. The Tenth Anniversary Declaration highlighted this claim. It said that 
‘one of the ultimate goals of the TICAD process is to forge solidarity between Africa 
and the rest of the international community based on ownership and partnership because 
African development can be achieved only by the concerted efforts of Africa and its 
development partners’. In practice, this approach implied the transfer of ‘Asia’s 
experiences and development strategy’ to African countries. 14 
During this last conference period, Japan continued its focus on ownership, partnership, 
and governance, especially by joining the momentum behind both TICAD and NEPAD. 
Japan linked its ODA policies to those generated from the Millennium Development 
Goals and other international aid initiatives. It became clear that some of the language 
and values used by earlier versions of Japan’s ODA policies made their way into these 
newer international aid documents. 
6 Conclusion 
The TICAD process provides an intriguing and informative opportunity to examine 
Japanese ODA strategy. As the country emerged into a dominant donor government in 
the 1990s, it sought to engage the other donor countries and institutions in a new 
dialogue on the scope and direction of foreign aid. Japan has made moves in recent 
years to counter the neoliberal policy emphasis on structural adjustment with a more 
nuanced approach emphasizing self-help policies, loans, and poverty reduction through 
industrial development. Taken as a whole, the TICAD process represents the Japanese 
government’s response to perceived inroads by globalization and neoliberal economic 
ideology. But TICAD is more than a simple response to complex global forces. Japan 
itself draws extensively from its perceived model of national and regional economic 
development as it hopes to influence non-Asian societies as in Africa. Moreover, by 
carving out a developmental niche away from the conventional World Bank pattern of 
financial assistance, Japan also hopes to highlight its global strategic position as it seeks 
to have greater influence in Africa and other developing regions.  
To a great extent, the TICAD process reflects Japan’s national economic identity and 
the influence of Japan’s Asian development strategy on its ODA policy to Africa. 
Through its long standing commitment to hold conferences on African development, the 
Japanese government significantly contributed to make the challenges of Africa better 
known in the international community and to present an alternative strategy to the 
Washington Consensus ideology. 
The success of TICAD can be seen in the diffusion of its core concepts to other aid 
agencies. The primary concepts of ownership and partnership have been incorporated 
into several international meetings, including the International Conference on Financing 
for Development in Monterrey, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and 
three consecutive G8 Summit meetings, beginning in 2002. In an independent review of 
TICAD, the author argued that ‘the twin objectives of ownership and partnership 
promoted by TICAD have now come to be accepted principles in development planning 
and cooperation … The advent of NEPAD has a number of positive implications for 
future cooperation within the TICAD framework, as TICAD is expected to serve as a 
major platform for global support for NEPAD’ (Rasmusson nd).  
In July 2005, the G8 summit illustrated a common approach to this mode of analysis by 
recent foreign aid and debt forgiveness policies. The G8 countries importantly backed 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s call for a doubling of foreign aid from US$25 billion 
annually to US$50 billion by 2010. Blair also recommended a further increase of 
another US$25 billion annually to be achieved by 2015. US President George W. Bush 
initially resisted Blair’s goals, but recently announced he would ask Congress to double 
US support for Africa from US$4.3 billion to more than US$8.6 billion in 2010. And 15 
the G8 as a group promised to write off US$40 billion in debt that 18 of the world’s 
poorest countries owe. 
During this fifteen year period of holding TICAD meetings, the Japanese government 
sought to promote an alternative financing and development approach. In contrast to the 
views commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus, Japan relied on its own 
development experiences as a guide in assisting African countries. Its experiences 
suggest to the Japanese government that state administrative functions have a crucial 
role in the development process. In particular, the state role can facilitate needed 
economic production as it appeared to occur in Japan and other Asian countries. What 
the Japanese government and the TICAD process are promoting, in part, is the reduction 
of poverty through economic production instead of direct funding of poverty programs. 
From Japan’s perspective, this emphasis adheres to the concept of ownership also 
highlighted in TICAD. As one review commented, ‘ownership is the premise of a 
‘developmental state’. In other words, that the state has a positive, facilitating role in the 
economy’ (Rasmusson nd). In interviews with TICAD and MoFA officials, they 
repeatedly commented on the necessary role of the state as both a lesson from the Asian 
experience and an important objective for African states. In a more recent statement at 
the 2004 TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference, the Minister of 
Economy, Trade and Industry commented that ‘I very much count on the initiatives of 
private players for the promotion of trade and investment; however, when the country’s 
economy is just about to take off, the role of the government in efficiently allocating the 
limited resources for the promotion of trade and investment that would prompt 
economic growth is important’ Nakagawa (2004: 2). 
The TICAD process has been a valuable means by which Japan has asserted itself as a 
world leader in the area of African economic development. As the government moves to 
hold TICAD IV in 2008, we will see greater attempts to consolidate and institutionalize 
Japan’s capacity as a leading donor country. The bureaucratic reforms taking place 
today among the donor agencies, the creation of ODA task forces for targeted African 
countries, and the continued emphasis on technical support underscore Japan’s 
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